Compromise and Union Herodotus and Thucydides:
In addition to this paper, the DTD has also developed more detailed "focus" papers that share insights and best practices for various specific challenges such as mission command and cross-domain synergy, assessments, CCIR development and reporting, and lethal and nonlethal integration observed at joint headquarters.
All of these papers are unclassified for broad accessibility. Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions local copyby DiBella, in Joint Force Quarterly, 2nd quarter The question remains as to what images will best fit national security organizations in an age that contains both evolving asymmetric threats and the potential for traditional threats.
Do we shift from a machine to a network or do we alter the properties of the machine? Either way generates change, but one could argue that only the former represents true transformation. The larger question is how we make such a transformation.
Given the political context of our national security apparatus, a dialectic framing of the task ahead seems appropriate. That means enlarging our capacity to resolve conflict. Both the Essay on thucydides peloponnesian war and multiplicity of organization theory contribute to the challenge of working in an interagency or joint environment.
It is best to recognize that in those contexts military leaders and civilian managers will have diverse and potentially contradictory views about what organizations are and how they can be changed.
Many of us are barely aware of our own theories much less those held by our counterparts who lead other organizations in an interagency or joint context.
That's not just the distant hope of open-source fans, it's the vision of James Stavridis, a highly accomplished Navy Admiral. Stavridis shares vivid moments from recent military history to explain why security of the future should be built with bridges rather than walls.
A Navy Admiral's thoughts on global security"] On Military Theory local copyby Vego, in Joint Force Quarterly, 3rd quarter All too often, the critical importance of military theory either is not well understood or is completely ignored by many officers. A reason for this is their apparent lack of knowledge and understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and the real purpose of military theory.
Many officers are also contemptuous of theory because they overemphasize the importance of technology Military Theory, Strategy, and Praxis local copyby Kipp and Grau, Military Review, Mar-Apr The enemy will always have a vote. Praxis attempts to make it an insignificant one.
Theory and strategy should be about the ends, ways, and means to counter that enemy and adapt to his changes. Praxis should direct future strategic choices, and technology should enhance the conduct of political and military conflict.
Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Pub 04, UnderstandingDec Understanding provides the context for the decision-making process which informs the application of national power. The purpose of understanding is to equip decision-makers at all levels with the insight and foresight required to make effective decisions as well as manage the associated risks and second and subsequent order effects.
The human domain concerns the interaction between human actors, their activity and their broader environment. It is defined as the totality of the human sphere of activity or knowledge.
This broad environment is shaped by 4 principal factors: The human domain framework considers these 4 areas as environments cultural, institutional, technological and physical to capture the interaction between human actors and their wider environment.
Actors must be set within their cultural, institutional, technological and physical environments to provide the appropriate context for developing understanding. Most military organizations and their leaders attempt to impose prewar conceptions on the war they are fighting rather than adapting their assumptions to reality.
They adapt only after great losses in men and national treasure. Effective military organizations adapt their prewar assumptions and concepts to reality. This inherent tension between the creation of disciplined, obedient military organizations, responsive to direction from above, and the creation of organizations adaptive to a world of constant change makes military innovation in peacetime and adaptation in war so difficult.
Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. On Metaphors We Are Led By local copyby Paparone, in Military Review, Nov-Dec With the clever and often hidden use of metaphors, the most effective thought leaders indoctrinate others to grasp and communicate the intractable or instrutable.
This essay proposes a framework that can help military practitioners judge the appropriate use of metaphor and be more reflective about how indoctrination can work to shape their "sensemaking" in important ways.
The Militant Ideology Atlased. This is the first systematic mapping of the ideology inspiring al-Qaeda. The empirically supported findings of the project are surprising: Among them, the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has had the most impact on other Jihadi thinkers and has been the most consequential in shaping the worldview of the Jihadi Movement.
In contrast, the study finds that Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have had little influence on other Jihadi theorists and strategists. Transition to the Information Age Demands Improvements to Professional Military Education System local copyCongressman Ike Skelton press release, 28 Sep 05 Imagine what might happen if a Rembrandt received a box of 16 crayons, and an average Joe was given a full palette of oil paints, easel, and canvas.Herodotus wrote about the wars between Persia and Greece.
Thucydides wrote about the civil war between Athens and Sparta. Together these ancient Greek writers became the first true historians in Western civilization. CIVIL WAR. In "Democracy after Civil War: A Kantian Paradox," New York University, November 16, , Leonard Wantchekon presents a theory of "post-civil war democratization" which draws upon the model of political order among rational demons as well as sources from "classical political theory, contemporary democratic theory, and the state-building literature.".
Thucydides (cc BC) was an insider during the Peloponesian War. He was an Athenian commander who was dismissed after his men lost a battle in spite of the fact of his previous successes. Here below is a list of the entire set of readings from Britannica's ten-year reading plan.
Please note that Adler's year suggested list of readings in Britannica's Great Books is .
Democracy is a tender topic for a writer: like motherhood and apple pie it is not to be criticized. One will risk being roundly condemned if he, or she, points out the serious bottleneck that is presented when a community attempts, through the democratic process, to set plans for positive social action.
Peloponnesian War Essay Example: Peloponnesian War is the war between two Greece centers with the largest political associations – Athens Empire and Peloponnesian League, under the head of Sparta.
A rivalry between them increased day by day and, finally, in the second half of the V-th century it took the form of the internal war ( .